现象证据与事实证据  

Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence

作　　者：苏珊娜.舍伦伯格 李大强[2] 刘冠帅 Susanna Schellenberg

机构地区：[1]美国罗格斯大学哲学系 [2]吉林大学哲学基础理论研究中心暨哲学社会学院

出　　处：《哲学分析》2019年第2期130-140,199,共12页Philosophical Analysis

摘　　要：知觉指引我们的行为,也给予我们关于周遭世界的证据;幻觉和错觉则会误导我们,它们会促使我们以并不与我们身边世界相契合的方式来误行,也会误导我们形成关于世界的错误信念。"能力观点"给证据提供了一种公平对待这两个事实的解释。它展示出为何幻觉和错觉会误导我们并促使我们误行。它进一步展示出了为何产生知觉而不是错觉的时候,我们才处于一个更好的认识位置上。"能力观点",即一种认为知觉经验因为应用在知觉过程中的知觉能力所具有的认知和形而上学的优先性,而具有认知力的观点。通过将经验的认知力奠基于有关经验的形而上学结构的事实,能力观点并不只是一个外在主义的观点,而更多地是一个带有知觉经验认识论的自然主义观点。所以它是一个可靠论的外在主义和自然主义替代物。讨论这个观点的影响,既是为了给信念以辩护,给心智状态以认知透明,也是为了给那些常见问题予以解答。Perception guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, it shows in virtue of what we are in a better epistemic position when we perceive than when we hallucination. In this paper, I develop the capacity view, that is, the view that perceptual experience has epistemic force in virtue of the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of the perceptual capacities employed in perception. By grounding the epistemic force of experience in facts about the metaphysical structure of experience, the capacity view is not only an externalist view, but moreover a naturalistic view of the epistemology of perceptual experience. So it is an externalist and naturalistic alternative to reliabilism. I discuss the repercussions of this view for the justification of beliefs and the epistemic transparency of mental states, as well as, familiar problem cases.

关 键 词：现象证据 事实证据 知觉 能力 辩护 认知透明 

分 类 号：B80[哲学宗教—思维科学]