基于逆向选择模型的企业技术委托开发合同分析  

作　　者：江喜林 董亮[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖北师范大学经济与管理学院 [2]桂林电子科技大学商学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2019年第4期83-88,共6页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"高寒藏区深度贫困诊断与稳定脱贫对策研究"(项目编号:18CMZ040);教育部人文社会科学研究项目"农业支持政策执行机制及其优化研究"(项目编号:15YJC790035);湖北师范大学优秀创新团队项目"我国城镇化阶段的低碳发展路径研究"(项目编号:T201514)

摘　　要：基于逆向选择模型分析技术委托开发中的信息不对称现象,研究表明:在委托人先行的情形下,不存在混同均衡,分离均衡有多个,存在一个连续的信号区间,高效率委托人在此区间内任意选择信号都可以显示自己的类型,区间内最低水平的信号是个体最优的;在代理人先行的情形下,代理人提供以技术质量和价格为内容的合同,存在唯一的分离均衡;信息不对称条件下高效率委托人的效用比对称信息时低,低效率委托人的效用不变。为促进技术委托开发市场的发展,规制机构应根据私人信息在委托人和代理人中的分布来设计交易机制,设计有效的价格支付机制,并支持技术中介组织等第三方组织的发展。Based on the adverse selection model,this paper analyzes the phenomenon of asymmetric information in the development of technical entrustment.The results show that in the case of the client taking the lead,there is no mixed equilibrium,there are multiple separation equilibrium,and there is a continuous signal interval,in which the high-efficiency principal can display its own type in any of the above-mentioned intervals,and the lowest level signal in the interval is the individual's optimal.In the case of an agent acting first,the agent provides contracts with technical quality and price as contents,and there is a unique separation equilibrium.Under the condition of information asymmetry,the utility of high-efficiency principal is lower than that of symmetric information,and the utility of inefficient principal is unchanged.In order to promote the development of the market of technology commissioned development,regulatory agencies should design trading mechanisms and effective price payment mechanism based on the distribution of private information among principals and agents,and support the development of third-party organizations such as technology intermediary organizations.

关 键 词：逆向选择 信号传递 信息甄别 技术委托开发 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F273.7[经济管理—国民经济]