管理者过度自信、代理成本与成本粘性  

Managerial Overconfidence,Agency Costs and Cost Stickiness

作　　者：杨位留[1] 杨金磊[1] YANG Wei-liu;YANG Jin-lei(School of Economics and Management,Zaozhuang University,Zaozhuang 277160,China)

机构地区：[1]枣庄学院经济与管理学院,山东枣庄277160

出　　处：《兰州财经大学学报》2019年第2期43-54,共12页Journal of Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：研究企业成本粘性有助于打开成本管理的"黑箱"。本文以成本粘性的驱动因素为切入点,将2012—2016年沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,探究管理者过度自信、两类代理成本与成本粘性之间的关系。研究结果表明,管理者过度自信与成本粘性显著正相关,第一类代理成本与成本粘性显著正相关,第二类代理成本与成本粘性的关系不显著。进一步利用因果逐步回归法和Bootstrap回归方法研究发现,第一类代理成本在管理者过度自信与成本粘性中存在显著的中介效应。Studying cost stickiness of enterprise could open the"black box"of cost management.Based on driving factors of the cost stickiness,this paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2016 as the research samples to explore the relationship between managerial overconfidence,two types of agency costs and cost stickiness.The results show that managerial overconfidence is significantly positively correlated with the cost stickiness.The first type of agency cost is significantly positively correlated with the cost stickiness.The relationship between the second type of agency cost and the cost stickiness is not significant.Further studies using causal stepwise regression and Bootstrap regression find that the first type of agency cost has a significant mediating effect both on managerial overconfidence and cost stickiness.

关 键 词：成本粘性 管理者过度自信 代理成本 中介效应 BOOTSTRAP 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F272.91[经济管理—国民经济]