权力失衡下的退货策略优化研究  

Research on Optimization of Return Policy under Power Imbalance

作　　者：吴红迪[1] 李新剑[1,2] WU Hong-di;LI Xin-jian(Anhui Technical College of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering,Wuhu,Anhui 241002;Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou,Zhejiang 310023)

机构地区：[1]安徽机电职业技术学院,安徽芜湖241002 [2]浙江工业大学,浙江杭州310023

出　　处：《怀化学院学报》2019年第2期47-50,共4页Journal of Huaihua University

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(17YJC630069);安徽机电职业技术学院重点项目(2017qjzd02);安徽省高校优秀青年人才支持计划项目(gxqq2018252)

摘　　要：研究权力失衡下占主导地位零售商与制造商的退货策略协调机制,分析零售商要求按照批发价格退货和采用退货策略退货两种情况。研究表明,1.零售商按照批发价格退货时,市场产量和总体收益均小于集中决策情况下的产量和收益,系统存在帕累托改进。2.零售商引入退货策略后,发现存在一个有效的退货价格使供应链成员零售商和制造商收益均得到提高,系统达到帕累托最优。This paper studies on imbalance of power, the coordination mechanism of return policy between retailers and manufacturers, analyzes two situations of retailers’ request to return goods according to wholesale price and using return policy.Research shows that 1. When retailers return goods at wholesale prices,the market output and total income are both smaller than those in the case of centralized decision-making. Pareto improvement exists in the system. 2. After the introduction of the return policy by the retailer, it is found that there is an effective return price, which improves the returns of both the retailer and the manufacturer in the supply chain,and the system reaches the Pareto Optimality.

关 键 词：权力失衡 退货策略 帕累托最优 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学]