管理层持股、代理成本与企业绩效  

Management Shareholding, Agency Costs and Corporate Performance

作　　者：张海燕[1] 刘璐瑶[1] ZHANG Hai-yan;LIU Lu-yao(Business School of Hunan Normal University, Changsha Hunan 410081)

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学商学院,湖南长沙410081

出　　处：《湖南财政经济学院学报》2019年第2期112-119,共8页Journal of Hunan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"实际控制人移民海外;利益侵占与治理机制研究"(项目编号:71702054)

摘　　要：基于双重委托代理问题,构建"管理层持股-代理成本-企业绩效"的中介效应模型,以2008-2017年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,重点探讨了两类代理成本的中介效应。研究发现:管理层持股与企业绩效显著正相关,两类代理成本在管理层持股与企业绩效之间均起着部分中介作用,管理层持股与第一类代理成本呈负相关,与第二类代理成本呈"U"型关系,管理层持股通过抑制两类代理成本的作用路径间接地对企业绩效产生正的中介作用。研究结论对于企业降低代理成本、提高激励效率,维护中小股东的利益提供了理论借鉴。Based on the problem of double principal-agent, this paper constructs the mediating effect model of "management shareholding,agency cost and coiporate performance". Taking China's A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017 as the research object, this paper mainly discusses the intermediary effect of two types of agency costs. The results show that: There is a significant positive correlation between management shareholding and corporate performance, management shareholding is negatively correlated with the first type of agency cost,and u-shaped relationship with the second type of agency cost. Management shareholding has a positive mediating effect on coiporate performance indirectly by inhibiting the action paths of two types of agency costs. It provides reference for enterprises to reduce agency costs, improve incentive efficiency and safeguard the interests of minority shareholders.

关 键 词：管理层持股 代理成本 企业绩效 中介效应 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]