没有主体的主体性——理解尼采后期哲学的一种新尝试  

Subjectivity without Subject: A New Understanding of Nietzsche’s Late Philosophy

作　　者：吴增定[1] Wu Zengding

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学研究》2019年第5期103-110,127,共9页Philosophical Research

摘　　要：本文试图在海德格尔和后现代主义哲学家的看法之外,对尼采的后期哲学给出一种新的解释。海德格尔批评尼采的后期哲学是一种主体性的形而上学,而后现代主义哲学家则认为尼采完全消解了主体性的问题。本文则认为,尼采哲学是一种全新的主体性哲学,即一种"没有主体的主体性哲学"。在他的哲学中,主体性并不依赖于一种理性的意识、我思、自我或主体,而是意味着一种前反思性的生命本能或权力意志。换言之,真正的主体性意味着生命本能或权力意志的主动性(Aktivitt)或自发性(Spontaneitt),也就是权力意志向外和向上的自发性的释放与扩张。与此相对,传统形而上学所理解的主体性一方面是从权力意志的主动、自发和原初的主体性中抽象和派生出来的,另一方面也是对于这种主体性的否定和压制。This paper intends to give a new interpretation of Nietzsche's late philosophy,which differs from both Heidegger's and postmodern philosophers' interpretations.According to Heidegger,Nietzsche's late philosophy is a kind of metaphysics of subjectivity.However,postmodern philosophers regard Nietzsche's late philosophy as a complete rejection of subjectivity.This paper holds that Nietzsche's late philosophy is a new philosophy of subjectivity,that is,a philosophy of "subjectivity without subject." In Nietzsche's new philosophy of subjectivity,subjectivity no longer relies on a rational and conscious ego or subject,but rather represents a pre-conscious life instinct or the will to power.Accordingly,"subjectivity without subject" means the activity and spontaneity of the will to power,that is,the spontaneous release and expansion of the will to power.On the contrary,the subject of traditional metaphysics not only derives from the original subjectivity,but also denies and suppresses the latter.

关 键 词：主体性 主体 权力意志 自发性 

分 类 号：B516.47[哲学宗教—外国哲学]