初次创业失败者后续创业意向的演化博弈分析  

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Subsequent Entrepreneurial Intention of the Initial Entrepreneurial Loser

作　　者：王朝云[1] 唐明月 Wang Chaoyun;Tang Mingyue(School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei 230601,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《经济与管理》2019年第3期12-17,共6页Economy and Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金项目(12YJA630116)

摘　　要：初次创业失败者在经历创业失败之后,选择就业还是再次创业是一个值得关注的问题。借助演化博弈的相关理论,建立初次创业失败者的后续创业意向演化博弈模型,求解出演化稳定策略,分析政府补贴、就业的工资水平、再次创业失败造成的竞争成本以及创业成功后获得的超额收益对这一选择过程的影响。研究得出:政府补贴和再次创业成功获得的超额收益对初次创业失败者的后续创业意向选择影响比较大,而竞争成本的影响相对较小。After the failure of starting a business for the first time,the choice of employment or starting a business again is a problem worthy of attention.With the help of the theory of evolutionary game,the evolutionary game model of the subsequent entrepreneurial intention of the initial entrepreneurial loser is established,the evolutionary stability strategy is solved,and the influence of government subsidies,the wage level of employment,the competitive cost caused by the failure of the second venture and the excess return obtained after the success of the venture on the selection process is analyzed.The reswlts show that the government subsidies and excess earnings from the successful re-entrepreneurship have a greater impact on the subsequent entrepreneurial intention of the inital entrepreneurial loser,while the impact of competion costs is relatively small.

关 键 词：后续创业意向 初次创业失败者 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]