青年海德格尔的反心理主义思想  

On Young Heidegger’s Anti-psychologism

作　　者：吴三喜 孙雯 

机构地区：[1]河北师范大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2019年第3期63-69,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“克尔凯郭尔主体性真理观研究”(15CZX031);河北省教育厅2018年度人文社科研究青年基金“现代反心理主义指称理论研究”(SQ181178)

摘　　要：在现象学语境中,心理主义特指19世纪后期至20世纪初的一种哲学研究趋势,它主张取消观念规律和实在规律之间的差异,消除逻辑之物和心理之物的分野,力图将逻辑规范性还原为心理规律性。心理主义的这种做法被胡塞尔概括为三个成见,即认识的规范性需以认识的心理学为基础、逻辑的事实性内容乃是诸多心理构件、逻辑学乃是明见性理论。心理主义的关键在于其判断理论,冯特、迈尔、布伦塔诺以及利普斯等人的判断理论是心理主义判断理论的典型代表。青年海德格尔继承胡塞尔的反心理主义立场,指明了心理主义判断理论的根本错误在于错失了逻辑学的现实性问题,取消了心理学的现实性与逻辑学的现实性之间的不可通约性。在借鉴洛采的现实性理论之后,海德格尔明确将逻辑学的现实性规定为有效而非实存,由此便成功地将逻辑学移除出心理主义领域。In the context of phenomenology,psychologism means a kind of tendency in the field of philosophy starting from the late 19th century to the early 20th century. It aims at removing the difference between ideal laws and real laws,eliminating the gap between the logical and the psychological,trying reducing the logical norms to the psychological laws. Husserl summarized its features as three prejudices,i. e. the norm of cognition is based on the psychology of cognition;the real elements of logic are psychological ones;and logic is a theory of evidence. The core of psychologism is the theory of judgement which takes on itself in the philosophy of Wundt,Maier,Brentano and Lipps. The young Heidegger inherits Husserl’s anti-psychologism and makes it clear that psychologism mistakes the Wirklichkeit of logic,misunderstands the difference between the Wirklichkeit of logic and of psychology.Heidegger redefines the Wirklichkeit of logic as Geltung not Existenz by absorbing Lotze’s theory of Wirklichkeit,thus he successfully separates logic from psychologism.

关 键 词：心理主义 判断 反心理主义 现实性 有效 

分 类 号：B151[哲学宗教—世界哲学]