股权激励计划对企业组织资本的影响——基于中国上市公司的经验数据  

The Impact of Stock Option on Company Organization Capital——Evidence from Listed Firms in China

作　　者：崔慧洁 陈翀 张亚男 CUI Hui-jie;CHEN Chong;ZHANG Ya-nan(Beijing Foreign Studies University,Beijing100089,China;City University of Hong Kong,Hong Kong SAR999077,China;Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing100081,China)

机构地区：[1]北京外国语大学国际商学院,北京市100089 [2]香港城市大学商学院,香港特别行政区999077 [3]中央财经大学会计学院,北京市100081

出　　处：《中国流通经济》2019年第6期109-117,共9页China Business and Market

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目“收购方管理层能力与我国上市公司并购活动分析”(2016QD011),“‘一带一路’背景下会计准则融合发展对我国企业跨国并购的影响”(2018JJ019)

摘　　要：现有关于股权激励的理论认为,一方面,股权激励有助于缓解高管与股东间的委托代理冲突,进而帮助企业实现更高的价值(激励假说);另一方面,股权激励被认为是对高管的一种补偿,是高管权力的象征,对于解决委托代理问题并无益处(福利假说)。基于我国上市公司2005—2017年样本,采用实证分析方法研究股权激励对企业组织资本的影响和作用机制,结果发现:实施股权激励计划的上市公司,其组织资本会得到显著提升(这一结果支持了激励假说);公司的内部治理机制及外部治理机制与股权激励的作用存在一定的替代作用,股权激励对企业组织资本的积极效应在企业独立董事比例越低、监事会规模越小、机构投资者持股比例越低的情况下越显著。因此,企业在制定股权激励策略时,除了考虑短期绩效改善之外,可以将股权激励与企业长期发展所需的组织资本积累相结合,综合考量企业自身内部与外部治理机制的完善程度,从而达到效用最大化。Existing theories concerning stock option believe that:on the one hand,stock option will be helpful in relieving the principal-agent conflict between top managers and shareholders,which will in turn help the enterprises to realize higher value (the incentive hypothesis);on the other hand,stock option is identified as a kind of compensation for top managers,which will be not beneficial for us to solve the principal-agent problem (the welfare hypothesis). Based on the sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2017,the authors carry out the empirical research on the impact of stock option on company organization capital, and the mechanism of that. It is found that:stock option plays a significant positive role in enhancing firms’organization capital (supporting the incentive hypothesis);the role of stock option will be more significant with lower percentage of corporate independent directors,smaller scale of board of supervisors,and lower percentage of institutional stockholders. While formulating the stock option strategy,besides the short-term performance improvement,the enterprises should also combine the stock option with organization capital accumulation needed by the long- term corporate development and comprehensively consider the perfect level of corporate internal and external governance mechanism to achieve the result of utility maximization.

关 键 词：股权激励 组织资本 内部治理 外部治理 

分 类 号：F272.1[经济管理—企业管理]