不同再制造渠道下的两阶段闭环供应链决策  

Decision-Making of Two-Period Closed-Loop Supply Chain in Different Remanufacturing Channels

作　　者：解凤珏 徐朗 汪传旭[1] 陈伟宏[3] XIE Fengjue;XU Lang;WANG Chuanxu;CHEN Weihong(School of Economicsand Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China;College of Transportand Communications,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China;School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510006,China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306 [2]上海海事大学交通运输学院,上海201306 [3]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州530006

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2019年第3期587-593,600,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71373157,71774109,51879156)

摘　　要：考虑消费者对新制造产品和再制造产品支付意愿存在差异,针对零售商主导的两阶段闭环供应链系统,通过Stackelberg博弈理论分别构建了由零售商、制造商和第三方作为再制造主体的决策模型,进而探讨了不同再制造渠道下的最优决策。通过理论和算例分析,发现再制造努力程度与再制造偏好程度的变化对不同再制造渠道下的两阶段闭环供应链成员定价与再制造决策是存在差异。Considering the fact that consumers’ willingness to pay(WTP) for the new product and the remanufactured product is heterogeneous, decision models including three scenarios(respectively the retailer, manufacturer and the third part as collector) have been built using Stackelberg game based on the retailer-dominated closed-loop supply chain. Then, the equilibrium decisions were obtained and the effect of related coefficients on optimal profits was analyzed. The theoretical and numerical analysis show that the remanufacturing effort and remanufacturing preference are different in decision-making of pricing and remanufacturing in closed-loop supply chain in different remanufacturing channels.

关 键 词：消费者偏好 再制造渠道 闭环供应链 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]