道德风险和逆向选择共存下高校教师激励机制设计  

Design of Incentive Mechanism for University Faculty under the Coexistence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

作　　者：陈克贵[1] 张明慧[1] 曹庆仁[1] CHEN Ke-gui;ZHANG Ming-hui;CAO Qing-ren(School of Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou,221116,China)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院

出　　处：《高等理科教育》2019年第3期46-53,共8页Higher Education of Sciences

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目“不对称信息下考虑行为特征的销售激励问题研究”(项目编号:17YJC630012);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学一般项目(项目编号:2015SJD430);中国矿业大学教育教学改革与建设项目“信息不对称下高校课堂管理工作的改革探索——以经管类专业‘统计学’课程为例”(项目编号:2016QN23);中国矿业大学精品课程建设项目“统计学精品课程建设”(项目编号:2017JPPY05)

摘　　要：高校教师是高校教学科研的具体承担者,为高校教师设计合理的激励机制是高校管理的重要环节。文章在高校教师教学科研投入和能力水平信息不对称下,基于委托代理理论建立道德风险和逆向选择并存的激励模型,进而分析最优激励契约的特征。结果体现了信息的价值及其对高校和教师双方收益的影响,对改进我国高校教师的激励机制具有重要的指导意义。University teachers are the specific executors of the task of teaching and scientific research in colleges.Designing reasonable incentive mechanism for university teachers is an important part of university management.Based upon principal-agent theory, this paper designed an incentive model for the colleges under the coexistence of moral hazard and adverse selection considering the asymmetric information between teaching and scientific effort and private working ability, the characteristics of the optimal incentive contract are analyzed.The result implies the value of information, and its effect to the decisions and revenue of both sides.The conclusion is valuable and significant to the improvement of incentive mechanism for university faculty.

关 键 词：高校教师激励机制 信息不对称 教学科研 委托代理理论 

分 类 号：G645[文化科学—高等教育学]