需求中断下具零售商激励的双渠道供应链价格与生产决策  

Price and Production Decision of Dual Channel Supply Chain with Retailer Incentive Under Demand Disruption

作　　者：李一龙 颜荣芳 Ll Yilong;YAN Rongfang(College of Mathematics and Statistics,Northwest Normal University,Lanzhou,Gansu 730070,China)

机构地区：[1]西北师范大学数学与统计学院

出　　处：《经济数学》2019年第2期77-84,共8页Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471148,11861058)

摘　　要：研究了由一个制造商和一个零售商所组成的两周期双渠道供应链.在第一周期需求实现之前,建立了生产量;在第二周期,基于第一周期的生产量和需求的实现确定了最优销售价格,进而确定了最优的生产量,实现了生产量的优化.通过需求中断下制造商和零售商的垂直整合,讨论了中断情形下价格和生产量对利润的影响.实证结果证实,集中式供应链的最优价格决策受零售渠道顾客偏好和市场规模变化的影响较为显著.A two-cycle two-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is studied.Before the demand of the first cycle is realized,aproduction quantity is established.In the second cycle,the optimal selling price is determined based on the production quantity and demand realization of the first cycle,and then the optimal production quantity is determined to realize the optimization of the production quantity.With the vertical integration of retailers,the effect of price and production quantity on profit under disruption is discussed.Empirical results confirm that the optimal price decisions of centralized supply chain is significantly affected by the change of customer preference and market size of retail channels.

关 键 词：供应链管理 双渠道 博弈论 中断管理 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]