高管激励、会计稳健性与投资效率  

Executive Incentives, Accounting Conservatism and Investment Efficiency

作　　者：王桂花[1] 彭建宇 WANG Gui-hua;PENG Jian-yu(Tongling College,Tongling 244000;Data Center of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,Shanghai 200131,China)

机构地区：[1]铜陵学院会计学院,安徽铜陵244000 [2]中国工商银行数据中心,上海200131

出　　处：《当代财经》2019年第7期130-139,共10页Contemporary Finance and Economics

摘　　要：以1996-2016年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,实证分析了会计稳健性与投资效率的关系,以及高管激励对会计稳健性与投资效率的调节作用。研究发现:会计稳健性可抑制过度投资,缓解投资不足,改善投资效率;高管货币薪酬激励增强了会计稳健性对过度投资的抑制作用,而高管股权激励削弱了会计稳健性对过度投资的约束作用。进一步研究发现:民营企业中高管货币薪酬激励增强了会计稳健性对过度投资的抑制作用,而国有企业的高管股权激励削弱了会计稳健性对过度投资的抑制作用。在会计稳健性水平较低的公司,高管货币薪酬激励和高管股权激励均能显著抑制过度投资。Taking the A-share listed companies from 1996 to 2016 as the research object, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between accounting conservatism and investment efficiency, and the adjustment effect of executive incentives on accounting conservatism and investment efficiency. The findings show that accounting conservatism can inhibit excessive investment, alleviate under-investment and improve investment efficiency, and that executive monetary compensation incentives can enhance the inhibition effect of accounting conservatism on over-investment, while executive equity incentives will weaken the inhibition effect of accounting conservatism on over-investment. Further research finds that the incentives of executives’ monetary compensation in private enterprises will enhance the restraining effect of accounting conservatism on over-investment, while the executive equity incentives of state-owned enterprises will weaken the inhibition of accounting conservatism on over-investment. In companies with lower levels of accounting conservatism, both the executive monetary compensation incentives and executive equity incentives can significantly inhibit over-investment.

关 键 词：高管激励 会计稳健性 投资效率 

分 类 号：F275.2[经济管理—企业管理]