董事联结能抑制薪酬粘性吗?——管理层权力的中介效应研究  

Can Board Interlocks Inhibit Compensation Stickiness?——Based on the Mediating Effect of Managerial Power

作　　者：李洋 汪平[1] 王庆娟[1,3] LI Yang;WANG Ping;WANG Qingjuan(Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070;Sichuan Normal University,Chengdu 610101;Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou 450046)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京100070 [2]四川师范大学商学院 [3]河南财经政法大学会计学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2019年第7期128-144,共17页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“公司治理、管理层权力与薪酬差距激励效应研究”(17BGL078);浙江省人文社会科学基地项目“连锁董事网络对高管薪酬激励的影响研究——基于内外部监督视角”(JYTgs20161101)

摘　　要：作为一种信息传导路径与资源共享平台,董事联结能为高管权力监督、薪酬粘性治理发挥重要功效。基于社会网络理论与弱联结优势理论,考察董事联结对高管薪酬粘性的影响机理,并探究管理层权力在其中的作用路径。研究发现,董事网络中心度越高,高管薪酬粘性越弱;管理层权力在二者关系中存在部分中介效应,约束管理层权力是网络位置降低薪酬粘性的一条有效路径。进一步区分联结强度后发现,内部董事强联结通过扩大管理层权力加剧高管薪酬粘性,外部董事弱联结通过约束管理层权力抑制高管薪酬粘性,且弱联结优势下管理层权力的中介效应比例最大。以高管任期作为管理层权力的工具变量缓解潜在的内生性影响,基准回归结论比较稳健。As the information transmission path and the resource sharing platform,board interlocks can play an important role in supervising executive power and governance of compensation stickiness.Based on the social network theory and the weak interlocks advantage theory,this paper investigates the influence mechanism of board interlocks on executive compensation stickiness,and explores the acting path of managerial power in it.The results show the higher the board network centrality,the weaker the executive compensation stickiness,and there is a partial mediating effect of managerial power in the relationship between them.Therefore,restricting managerial power is an effective path to reduce compensation stickiness by network location.After distinguishing the interlocks strength,further research shows the strong interlocks of internal directors aggravate executive compensation stickiness by expanding managerial power,while the weak interlocks of external directors inhibit it by restraining managerial power.In addition,the mediating effect proportion of managerial power is the largest under the weak interlocks advantage.Furthermore,taking executive tenure as an instrumental variable of managerial power to alleviate the potential endogenous influence,the 2SLS results indicate that the OLS results are relatively robust.

关 键 词：董事联结 高管薪酬粘性 管理层权力 网络中心度 联结强度 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]