基于演化博弈的装备制造产业关键共性技术合作创新  

作　　者：毕鹏 陈伟[3] 

机构地区：[1]石河子大学经济与管理学院 [2]佳木斯大学经济与管理学院,新疆石河子832000 [3]哈尔滨工程大学经济与管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150000

出　　处：《企业经济》2019年第7期25-33,共9页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目“军民深度融合评估理论方法及评价标准研究”(项目编号:HEUCFZ1601);黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目“黑龙江省创新生态系统与高校双创教育联动机制研究”(项目编号:18GLE476);黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目“‘互联网+’战略下我省‘大众创业、万众创新’的路径拓展与发展机制研究”(项目编号:16GLB10)

摘　　要：针对目前我国装备制造企业在技术创新中以企业合作方式进行关键共性技术研发所面临的复杂管理问题,运用演化博弈方法,构建了装备制造企业博弈主体合作创新策略选择的决策模型,在引入政府宏观调控机制基础上,对比分析影响系统演化至理想状态的关键因素,并对关键参数进行了数值仿真分析。结果表明:较高的违约成本与合理的创新收益分配机制能够使博弈主体均选择坚持合作的演化稳定策略。但是,由于市场失灵现象的存在,会产生部分博弈主体均选择中途背叛的演化稳定策略。因此,本文提出合理制定创新收益分配方案、引入政府宏观调控机制、有效利用并发挥市场调节机制的建议,促使博弈主体均选择坚持合作的演化稳定策略。Aiming at the complex management problems faced by equipment manufacturing enterprises in technological innovation in China,which use enterprise cooperation to develop key common technologies,this paper uses evolutionary game theory to construct a decision-making model of cooperative innovation strategy selection for equipment manufacturing enterprises.On the basis of introducing government macro-control mechanism,the key factors affecting system evolution to ideal state are compared and analyzed.The key parameters are analyzed by numerical simulation.The results show that the higher default cost and the reasonable distribution mechanism of innovative income can make the players choose the evolutionary stabilization strategy of insisting on cooperation,but due to the existence of market failure,some players will choose the evolutionary stabilization strategy of betraying in the middle.Therefore,this paper puts forward the suggestions of rational formulation of innovative income distribution scheme,introduction of government macro-control mechanism,and effective use and play of market regulation mechanism so as to prompt the players to choose the evolutionary stabilization strategy of insisting on cooperation.

关 键 词：装备制造企业 关键共性技术 技术合作创新 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]