考虑要素投入与市场地位的物流联盟演化研究  

Evolution Game of Logistics Alliance with Considering Input Elements and Market Power

作　　者：陈信同 李帮义[1] 王哲[1] 马晓平[1] 周扬 CHEN Xin-tong;LI Bang-yi;WANG Zhe;MA Xiao-ping;ZHOU Yang(College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China;College of Continuing Education, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211106 [2]南京航空航天大学继续教育学院,江苏南京210016

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2019年第7期64-71,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(NP2016303,NS2017057);江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(KYZZ16_0151);教育部人文社科青年基金项目(17YJCZH201)

摘　　要：针对物流联盟成员间的差异化,研究物流联盟的演化与稳定问题。以企业的要素投入与市场地位为依据,将联盟成员划分为三类,并构建三者之间的演化博弈模型,分析了影响博弈主体策略选择的影响因素,通过模型分析确立三方策略趋于稳定的条件。结论表明,联盟的惩罚力度、成员间的交易费用以及投机获利对联盟成员的策略选择以及物流联盟的稳定性有着重要影响。联盟成员间的激励、优惠政策比单方面的联盟惩罚更能促进联盟成员的积极合作。In view of the differentiation among the members of the logistics alliance, this paper studies the evolution and stability of the logistics alliance. According to enterprise’ s input elements and market power, the alliance members can be divided into three categories. And the evolutionary game model between the three is constructed. This paper analyzes the factors that influence the strategy choice of game players, and establishes the conditions for the stability of the three parties’ strategies through model analysis. The results show that the punishment of alliance, the transaction cost among members and the profit of speculation have significant influence on the selection of alliance members and the stability of the logistics alliance. The incentive and preferential policies among the alliance members can promote more active cooperation of the alliance members than the unilateral alliance punishment.

关 键 词：物流联盟 差异化 演化博弈 三方博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]