闭环供应链的奖惩分享博弈策略  

Game Strategy of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Reward-Penalty Sharing

作　　者：司凤山[1] 夏日[1] 孙玉涛[1] 王晶[2] SI Fengshan;XIA Ri;SUN Yutao;WANG Jing(School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu 233030,China;Faculty of Science,Bengbu University,Bengbu 233030,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学管理科学与工程学院,安徽蚌埠233030 [2]蚌埠学院理学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《沈阳大学学报（自然科学版）》2019年第4期302-306,共5页Journal of Shenyang University：Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金数学天元青年基金资助项目(11626033);安徽省教育厅高校人文社会科学研究重点项目(SK2017A0434);安徽省教育厅高校优秀青年人才支持计划项目(gxyq2017101);安徽省高校自然科学研究项目(KJ2017A428)

摘　　要：在考虑政府依据回收率对回收商进行奖惩的基础上,通过构建闭环供应链博弈模型给出协调机制下Stackelberg博弈的最优策略及其存在条件,分析奖惩力度和奖惩标准对最优策略的影响.设计的奖惩协调机制实现了政府同时对回收商和制造商的干预.研究表明:提高奖惩力度能够提升废品回收率、降低产品零售价、增加决策者利润;提高奖惩标准会增加决策者获利的难度,对零售商和回收商尤为明显.Considering that the government rewards and punishes the recyclers according to the recovery rate,the optimal strategy of Stackelberg game under the coordination mechanism and its existing conditions are given by constructing a closed-loop supply chain game model,and the influence of reward and punishment intensity and reward and punishment criteria on the optimal strategy is analyzed.The incentive-punishment coordination mechanism designed has realized the government s intervention to recyclers and manufacturer at the same time.The results show that increasing incentives and penalties can improve the recovery rate of waste products,reduce the retail prices of products,and increase the profits of decision makers.Increasing incentives and penalties standards will increase the difficulty for decision makers to make profits,especially for retailer and recycler.

关 键 词：奖惩分享 协调机制 闭环供应链 博弈 回收率 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]