员工持股计划与薪酬粘性差距  

Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Pay Stickiness Gap

作　　者：张永冀[1,2,3] 吕彤彤 苏治 Zhang Yongji

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,100081 [2]中央财经大学统计与数学学院,100081 [3]中央财经大学金融学院,100081

出　　处：《会计研究》2019年第8期55-63,共9页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71102110)的支持

摘　　要：本文以2011-2017年全部A股上市公司为研究样本,考察员工持股计划对公司员工的薪酬-业绩敏感性、薪酬粘性与高管-员工薪酬粘性差距的影响。研究发现,员工持股计划显著增强了我国上市公司员工薪酬-业绩敏感性与薪酬粘性,显著缩小了高管-员工薪酬粘性差距,进一步研究还发现在高管权力较弱或成长性较低的公司,员工持股计划的作用会更为明显。研究结果表明员工持股计划有效缓解了公司内部薪酬分配规则的不公平问题,支持了员工持股计划的心理所有权理论,员工持股计划促进了员工的股东身份认同感,增强了员工在薪酬谈判中的议价能力,实现了员工从“被动接受”到“主动争取”的角色转变,从而减少高管自利操纵行为,有助于改善公司治理。This paper studies the effect of employee stock ownership plan on the pay-performance sensitivity,pay stickiness of employees and pay stickiness gap between executives and employees in Chinese listed firms by using 2 011-2017 data.W e found that the employee stock ownership plan enhances the pay-performance sensitivity and pay stickiness of employees and also shrinks the pay stickiness gap between executives and employees significantly.According to the psychological ownership theory,the employee stock ownership plan enhances bargaining power of employees during the pay negotiation and changes their role in the negotiation from"passive receiver"to"active aspirant",which reduces self-interested behaviors of executives and inequality of pay distribution between executives and employees.

关 键 词：员工持股计划 薪酬-业绩敏感性 薪酬粘性 薪酬粘性差距 规则公平 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]