个人性与非个人性:功利主义的正义批判与评析  

Individuality and Non-Individuality:Justice Criticism and Analysis of Utilitarianism

作　　者：柯彪 KE Biao(Sichuan University of Science & Engineering,Zigong 643000, Sichuan, China)

机构地区：[1]四川轻化工大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《贵阳学院学报（社会科学版）》2019年第4期24-32,共9页Journal of Guiyang University:Social Sciences

基　　金：2014年度国家社科基金项目:“代际正义——科学发展的政治哲学研究”(项目编号:14BZZ013)阶段性成果

摘　　要：功利主义试图将个人性的快乐利己主义与非个人性的普遍利他主义整合起来,并将其原则设定为最大多数人的最大幸福。功利主义批评者认为,普遍利他主义的非个人性无视个人自由与权利主张,最大化幸福的结果论则忽视了满足的总量在个人之间的公平分配。虽然功利主义的非个人性与个人自由权利可以相容,但是功利主义对于分配正义缺乏敏感性,建立在个人消极自由基础上的效用无法为正义提供充足的信息基础。Utilitarianism attempts to integrate individual happiness egoism with non-individual universal altruism, and set its principles as the greatest happiness of the majority. Utilitarian critics argue that the impersonality of universal altruism ignores individual freedom and claims, while the consequentialism of maximizing happiness ignores the fair distribution of the total amount of satisfaction among individuals. Although the non- individuality of utilitarianism is compatible with the right of individual freedom, utilitarianism is insensitive to distributive justice. Utility based on individual negative freedom can’t provide sufficient information for justice.

关 键 词：功利主义 正义 个人性 非个人性 

分 类 号：B82-064[哲学宗教—伦理学]