C&T条件下碳排放核查三方博弈研究  

Trilateral Game Research into Carbon Emission Verification under the Conditions of C&T

作　　者：潘燕春[1] 杨雯[1] 马建华[1] 马楠 陈智民[1] 周明[1] PAN Yan-chun;YANG Wen;MA Jian-hua;MA Nan;CHENZhi-min;ZHOU Ming(College of Management,Center for Modeling and Optimization of Complex Management Systems,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen518060,China)

机构地区：[1]深圳大学管理学院深圳大学复杂管理系统建模与优化研究中心

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2019年第9期66-74,共9页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172057,71272089,71472126,71572114);广东省高等学校优秀青年教师培养计划项目(YQ2014152)

摘　　要：针对总量控制与交易机制(C&T)条件下的碳排放核查问题,构建了一个三方博弈模型,对控排企业、第三方核查机构和政府监管部门的博弈行为进行了分析,得到了该三方博弈的均衡条件;对于当前给定政府复查行为,分析了企业的最优上报碳强度。研究结果表明,“以历史碳强度为参考,控排企业上报碳强度差异越大复查概率越大”的政府复查机制存在一定的不合理性,尤其当实际碳强度高于参考碳强度时,可能导致控排企业和第三方核查机构的合谋;相对配额分配方式下,碳强度上升比总排放上升更可能导致控排企业瞒报碳排放,而且工业增加值高的大企业瞒报风险更高;当政府复查概率提高到一定程度时,可以有效抑制控排企业和第三方核查机构的合谋行为。本文的研究结果对政府碳排放复查政策的制定具有一定的借鉴意义。A trilateral game model is built to analyze the behavior among generating company,third-party of carbon emission verification and government under the conditions of cap-and-trade(C&T). The equilibrium of this trilateral game is then obtained. Given current re-verification mechanism of government,the optimal emission intensity reported for generating company is also analyzed. Our research reveals the following results. Firstly,the current re-verification mechanism of government,i.e. the re-verification probability increases with the difference between the emission intensity reported and the emission intensity for reference,is unreasonable to some extent. Especially when the real emission intensity is larger than the emission intensity for reference,it may lead to the collusion between generating company and third-party verification organization. Secondly,if relative emission allowance is allocated,the increase of emission intensity is more likely to result in collusion behavior than the increase of total carbon emission. Furthermore,higher collusion risk exists in large generating companies with high industrial added value. Finally,when the re-verification probability of government increases to some specific extent,the collusion between generating company and third-party verification organization can be effectively controlled. The research results of this paper are beneficial to the policy making of carbon emission re-verification for government.

关 键 词：总量控制与交易 碳排放核查 博弈 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]