何以要平等：康德、罗尔斯与阿马蒂亚·森  

Why Equality:Kant, Rawls and Amartya Sen

作　　者：薛丹妮[1,2] XUE Danni

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系 [2]上海社会科学院哲学研究所

出　　处：《哲学分析》2019年第5期93-102,198,共11页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：第59批中国博士后科学基金面上资助（项目编号：2016M591022）

摘　　要：人际差异要求平等正义理论在探求“什么要平等”(平等的内容)之前,回答“为什么要平等”(平等的根据),后者对确认现代世界不公正的经济不平等及其解决具有重要意义。由阿马蒂亚森明确提出却未能坚持到底的平等内容与根据之区分,在罗尔斯处的可能线索是作为平等根据的“人的特征”,并可进一步明晰为康德意义上人之为人的本质特征,即“作为目的自身的人性”。作为社会正义价值的平等,就是要尊重人性,摒弃一切偶然因素而把每一个人都当作目的自身来平等对待,不但有关首要善品与资源等客观方面的平等分配正义如此,而且对于个人将客观条件转化为自身福利的能力等主观差异方面亦是必要的。Before exploring“ what equality”, namely the content of equality, this article answers the problem“ why equality”, namely the grounding of equality, which is required by rejecting interpersonal difference. This is of great significance to the confirmation and resolution of unfair economic inequalities in modern world. A possible clue of the distinction between the content and grounding of equality that Amartya Sen clearly stated but failed to adhere to, is“ human characteristics” as the grounding of equality in Rawls, which could be further clarified as Kant’s“ humanity as an end in itself”. Equality as the social justice value means respecting humanity, treating everyone as an end in himself equally without considering all chance factors, which is true not only for equal distributive justice in the objective aspects of primacy goods and resources, but also necessary for the subjective differences like individual capability of transforming objective conditions into their own well-being.

关 键 词：平等基础 作为目的自身的人性 分配正义 首要善品 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]