政治关联、股权集中度与企业绩效——基于民营房地产A股上市公司的实证分析  

Political connection,ownership concentration and corporate performance:Based on the empirical analysis of private real estate A-share listed companies

作　　者：杨孝安[1] 程振 陈宝东 范佳佳 YANG Xiaoan;CHENG Zhen;CHEN Baodong;FAN Jiajia(School of Management,Xi′an Polytechnic University,Xi′an 710048,China)

机构地区：[1]西安工程大学管理学院

出　　处：《西安工程大学学报》2019年第5期588-594,共7页Journal of Xi’an Polytechnic University

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(18YJC790007);陕西省社会科学基金项目(2018D32);陕西省科技厅软科学项目(2019KRM151)

摘　　要：针对国内房地产上市公司普遍存在政治关联,并在很大程度上影响了企业的绩效水平现象,采用多元线性回归以及2SLS的实证方法,分析我国房地产上市公司总经理和董事长各自的政治关联、股权集中度与企业绩效之间的关系。研究发现:董事长的政治关联与企业绩效显著正相关,总经理的政治关联与企业绩效显著负相关;股权集中度与企业绩效显著正相关;股权集中度会抑制董事长政治关联与企业绩效之间的正相关关系。将房地产全样本分为“股权制衡”与“一股独大”两种类型后,所得结论与上述全样本回归分析的结论仍相同。China′s real estate listed companies generally have the phenomenon of political connection,which affects the performance of corporate to a certain extent.Based on this,multiple linear regression and 2SLS empirical method are adopted to analyze the relationship among the political connection,ownership concentration and corporate performance of the general manager and chairman of the listed real estate companies in China.It is found that the political connection of the chairman is significantly positively correlated with corporate performance,while the political connection of the general manager is negatively correlated with corporate performance.The ownership concentration has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance,and the ownership concentration will suppress the positive correlation between chairman′s political connection and corporate performance.After dividing the whole sample of real estate into two types:“equity balance” and “one share is dominant”,the conclusions obtained are still the same as those of the above full sample regression analysis.

关 键 词：政治关联 股权集中度 股权制衡 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F272.5[经济管理—企业管理]