论施蒂纳对费尔巴哈人本学的批判及其限度——基于马克思哲学视角  

On Stirner’s Critique of the Feuerbach and Its Limits:From the Perspective of Marxist Philosophy

作　　者：王时中[1] 陈倩 WANG Shizhong;CHEN Qian(Faculty of Philosophy,Nankai University,Tianjin 300350,China;The School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学哲学院,天津300350 [2]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《湖南工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2019年第5期21-27,共7页Journal of Hunan University of Technology(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：如果说黑格尔的“绝对精神”是德意志意识形态的内核,其后的各学派均是对“绝对精神”的改造与推进,而费尔巴哈揭示了“绝对精神”的抽象本质因此破解了思辨哲学的秘密,那么施蒂纳又在费尔巴哈批判黑格尔的基础上,从一种极端的“唯我论”和利己主义出发,用费尔巴哈批判黑格尔的方式对费尔巴哈进行了再批判,开辟了一条不同于费尔巴哈“人本学”的道路,他的整个“唯我论”就是针对费尔巴哈的人本学提出的最大反题。只有在这种层层递进的关系中,才可能深刻把握马克思哲学的革命意义。Hegel’s“absolute spirit”can be called as the core of the German ideology.He provided the vast soil of theoretical germination for the later schools;While Feuerbach thought he has transcended Hegel and saw the abstract nature of“absolute spirit”so that he could decipher the secrets of the speculative philosophy;Stirner got through Feuerbach’s tactics and criticized Feuerbach in Feuerbach’s way to criticize Hegel.He has opened up a road different from Feuerbach’s humanism and the whole“solipsism”of him was the biggest antithesis for Feuerbach.Only though this view can we get the core idea of revolutionary significance of Marx’s Philosophy.

关 键 词：施蒂纳 费尔巴哈 人本学 思辨哲学 类本质 现实的人 马克思 

分 类 号：B516.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]