“政商旋转门”关闭与官员独董辞职的现金增持效应  

Politically Connected Directors and Corporate Financial Policy: Evidence from Forced Resignations in China

作　　者：田利辉 王可第 TIAN Lihui;WANG Kedi(Nankai University Institute of Finance and Development,Tianjin,300071)

机构地区：[1]南开大学金融发展研究院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2019年第5期123-136,共14页China Economic Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(17ZDA071);国家自然科学基金国际项目(7161101131);天津市科技发展战略研究计划(17ZLZXZF00900);中央基本科研业务费(63192314)的资助

摘　　要：2013年中组部印发《关于进一步规范党政领导干部在企业兼职(任职)问题的意见》,自此之后上市公司中的"官员独董"被强制辞职,制度性关闭了"政商旋转门",这为研究政商关系理论提供了很好的准自然实验。从现金持有角度出发,运用双重差分方法,本文发现"政商旋转门"关闭为民营企业带来现金增持效应和价值提升效应。进一步分析发现,如果辞职的官员独董具有金融相关背景或上市公司本身具有更严重的融资约束,官员独董辞职的现金增持效应更显著;倘若该企业所在地区市场化程度更高、法律环境更完善、金融发展更好,那么政治关联中断的冲击更小。本文认为,官员兼职独董妨碍了企业的公平竞争,亲清政商关系是我国企业市场化转型的必要条件。The Central Committee of the Communist Party in China issued the No. 18 Rule on Oct 30, 2013 to ban government officials from taking any positions in Chinese firms. Using this decision as a unique natural experiment, we examine the causal relation between political connections and non-state-owned firm’s cash policy. We find that after loss of political connections, affected firms increase their cash holding relative to otherwise unaffected firms in the post-event period. In addition, the increase of cash is more pronounced in firms with financial background government officials directors and high level of financial constraints. These affected firms enjoy higher marginal value of cash holding than do the unaffected firms. Future more, we find that formal institutions can weaken the effect. Overall, our results suggest that political connection has a significant effect on corporate financial policy.

关 键 词：政商关系 现金持有 官员独董 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] D630[政治法律—政治学]