基于博弈视角的跨境电商交易诚信机制设计  被引量:3

The Credit Mechanism Design of Cross-border E-commerce Based on Game Theory

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作  者:俞裕兰 杨靛青 YU Yulan;YANG Dianqing(International Economic and Trade Institute, Fujian Business University, Fuzhou, Fujian,350016, China;School of Economics and Management ,Fuzhou University, Fuzhou , Fujian,350108, China)

机构地区:[1]福建商学院国际经贸学院,福建福州350000 [2]福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350000

出  处:《牡丹江师范学院学报(社会科学版)》2019年第5期19-28,共10页Journal of Mudanjiang Normal University(Social Sciences Edition)

基  金:福建社会科学规划项目(FJ2019B139);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-10-0020);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(201135141100090);福建社会科学基金项目(FJ2018B092);博士后科学基金项目(2017M612118)

摘  要:随着全球跨境电商贸易的快速发展,中国已成为世界增长最快的跨境电商市场之一,跨境电商交易过程中的诚信机制问题也日益凸显。设计构建跨境电商交易诚信交易机制对中国跨境电商的发展有着重要的意义。文章在分析我国跨境电商现存问题基础上,运用博弈支付矩阵对跨境电商交易方进行诚信竞争博弈分析。构建模糊市场环境下的跨境电商交易诚信交易保证金机制,并模拟与分析该改机制的有效性。With the rapid development of global cross-border e-commerce trade, China has become one of the fastest growing cross-border e-commerce markets in the world. It is of great significance for the development of cross-border e-commerce in China to design and build an honest trading mechanism for cross-border e-commerce. Based on the analysis of the existing problems of cross-border e-commerce in China, this paper applies the game payment matrix to conduct the game analysis on the integrity competition of cross-border e-commerce traders. On this basis, the paper constructs the honest trading margin mechanism of cross-border e-commerce transactions under the fuzzy market environment, and simulates and analyzes the effectiveness of this mechanism.

关 键 词:跨境电商 诚信机制设计 模糊博弈 

分 类 号:F713.50[经济管理—市场营销]

 

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