两权分离度、分析师跟进与公司价值  

Separation of Cash Flow Rights from Control Rights, Analyst Following and Firm Value

作　　者：姚正海 YAO Zhenghai(School of Business,Jiangsu Normal University,Xuzhou 221116,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏师范大学商学院

出　　处：《邵阳学院学报（社会科学版）》2019年第5期57-65,共9页Journal of Shaoyang University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71602079)

摘　　要：以2003-2015年度上市公司作为样本,理论分析并实证检验了两权分离度、分析师跟进与公司价值之间的关系。研究表明:两权分离度对于公司价值的影响呈现出U型关系,可用二次函数进行刻画;分析师跟进在两权分离度对公司价值的影响作用过程中起调节作用,对于两权分离程度过高的公司,分析师跟进能够起到监督作用以降低终极控制人操纵公司价值的可能性。研究结论对于上市公司治理、中小投资者决策以及上市公司外部监管具有重要的借鉴意义。Taking listed firms from 2003 to 2015 in China as sample,this paper analyzes theoretically and tests empirically the relationship among the separation of cash flow rights from control rights,analyst following and firm value.The research shows that there exists a U-shape relationship between the separation of cash flow rights from control rights and firm value,which can be well characterized by quadratic function.Analyst following is of significant benefit to firm value,and for the firms of great separation of control and cash flow ownership,analyst following may serve as a moderator to help prohibit ultimate controller from manipulating firm value.The conclusions are of valuable reference to corporate governance,investment decision and external supervision of listed companies.

关 键 词：两权分离度 公司价值 分析师跟进 调节作用 

分 类 号：F272.13[经济管理—企业管理]