溢出确定时单边随机R&D企业的收购策略  

Takeover Strategy for the Unilateral Stochastic R&D Firm When Spillovers are Certain

作　　者：霍沛军[1] 陈继祥[2] 陈剑[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084 [2]上海交通大学工商管理系,上海200052

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2002年第4期9-12,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目 ( 70 0 710 16 )

摘　　要：在一个双寡头市场中 ,一个企业从事成本降低型R&D。R&D结局是随机的 ,但R&D成功时非创新企业获得的溢出是确定的。创新企业可以在进行R&D之前或之后收购竞争者 ,分别称为事前收购和事后收购。本文对事前收购和事后收购两种策略进行了对比分析。结果表明 ,当R&D溢出较大时创新企业将选择事前收购 ,而溢出较小时将选择事后收购。值得注意的是 ,创新企业选择的收购方式同时也使消费者剩余和R&D投资达到最大。最后指出 。In a duopoly market,one firm conducts cost-reducing R&D. R&D outcome is stochastic,yet the non-innovating firm gets certain spillovers from successful R&D.The innovating firm may take over its either before or after the R&D activities are conducted.The corresponding takeover polices are called ex-ante takover and ex-post takeover,respectively.This paper makes a comparison between ex-ante takeover and ex-post takeover.It is shown that,the innovating firm chooses ex-ante takeover for large spillover and ex-post takeover for small spillover.It is remarkable that the takeover policy chosen by the innovating firm also maximizes R&D investment and consumer surplus. Finally,it is pointed out that no takeover is never the innovating firm's optimal policy.

关 键 词：研究 发展 收购方式 溢出 COURNOT竞争 收购兼并 单边随机R&D企业 收购策略 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]