企业集团内部团队生产的最优激励机制研究  

Research on the Optimal Incentive Schemes of Team Production Within Enterpris Group

作　　者：林旭东[1] 李一智[2] 沈福喜[3] 

机构地区：[1]深圳大学管理学院,广东深圳518060 [2]中南大学商学院,长沙410083 [3]湖南大学统计学系,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2002年第4期67-71,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

摘　　要：本文提供了企业集团内部团队生产的多代理人模型 ,从激励的角度分析了模型的解及其特征 ,重点讨论了帮助努力对设计最优激励契约的影响 ;在此基础上 ,获得了团队工作是最优的充分条件 ;最后 ,就所有权因子的激励与扭曲效应进行了阐述 。This paper provides a multi-agent model on team production within enterprise group, analyzes the model's solution and its characteristics from the incentive view, and emphatically discusses the influences of helping effort on designing the optimal incentive contract. Based on that, a sufficient condition for team work to be optimal is obtained. Finally, the incentive and distortion effects of ownership coefficient are demonstrated, and it's pointed out it's the distortion effect that causes the low-efficiency possibility of team production.

关 键 词：企业集团 团队生产 最优激励机制 所有权因子 多代理人模型 扭曲效应 

分 类 号：F276.41[经济管理—企业管理] F270[经济管理—国民经济]