我国上市公司盈余操纵行为的制度经济学分析  

Analysis of the Listed Firms' Earning Manipulation from the Angle of Institutional Economics

作　　者：姚树荣[1] 王志芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学经济学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《四川大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2002年第6期122-126,共5页Journal of Sichuan University：Philosophy and Social Science Edition

摘　　要：我国上市公司的盈余操纵行为已对证券市场的信誉形成强烈冲击。盈余操纵风险主要由盈余操纵的动机、机会、发现概率和惩罚力度四“因子”组成。因此 ,要有效地抑制盈余操纵行为 ,必须通过合理的制度设计 ,构筑起综合的、多层面性的防范和治理体系 ,削弱其动机 ,减少其机会 ,提高其发现概率和惩罚力度。The listed firms' earning manipulation has spoiled the prestige of capital market. The risk of earning manipulation consists of motivation, opportunity, exposure probability and degree of punishment. We should design a rational system which can weaken its motivation, diminish its opportunity, increase its exposure probability and punishment degree in order to restrain the listed firms' earning manipulation.

关 键 词：上市公司 盈余操纵 制度经济学 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]