业绩补偿承诺对信息不对称的缓解效应——来自中小板与创业板的经验研究  

Mitigation Effect of Performance Compensation Commitment on Information Asymmetry: An Empirical Research Based on the SME Board and GEM Market

作　　者：尹美群[1] 吴博 YIN Mei-qun;WU Bo

机构地区：[1]北京第二外国语学院商学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2019年第10期53-67,共15页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：北京市社会科学基金项目“社会网络媒体、投资者情绪与非效率投资”(项目编号:18GLB038);北京市教委科技提升计划项目“一带一路背景下首都资本输出下的海外投资风险研究”(项目编号:PXM2017_014221_000021_00261935_F)

摘　　要：本文以2012-2016年间中小企业板和创业板市场的823起并购事件作为研究样本,基于信息不对称的角度,考察了业绩补偿承诺对并购绩效的影响。本文的实证研究发现,基于代理理论的视角,超额现金持有越高、股权越集中,收购企业采用业绩补偿承诺的可能性越小;基于并购风险的角度,并购规模越大,收购企业越可能采用业绩补偿承诺。在并购交易中引入业绩补偿承诺协议可以揭示企业的价值,有效降低企业管理层与外部投资者之间的信息不对称程度,显著提高并购绩效。进一步研究发现,股份补偿的信号作用比现金补偿的信号作用更加明显,相对采用现金补偿的并购,采用股份补偿的并购绩效更高。本文的研究结论解释了业绩补偿承诺显著提高并购绩效的原因,丰富了业绩补偿承诺和并购领域的研究。Based on the 823 mergers and acquisitions in the SME board and the Growth Enterprise Market between 2012 and 2016,this paper examines the impact of performance compensation commitments on M&A performance based on information asymmetry.Empirical research in this paper finds that,from the perspective of agency theory,the higher the excess cash holdings and the more concentrated the equity,the less likely the acquisition firms will adopt performance compensation commitment;from the perspective of M&A risk,the larger the scale of M&A,the more likely the acquisition firms will adopt performance compensation commitment.The introduction of performance compensation commitment agreements in M&A transactions can reveal the value of enterprises,effectively reduce the degree of information asymmetry between management and external investors,and significantly improve M&A performance.Further research finds that the signal effect of share compensation is more obvious than that of cash compensation.Compared with the merger with cash compensation,the performance of the merger with share compensation is higher.The conclusion of this paper explains the reason why performance compensation commitment significantly improves the performance of M&A,and enriches the research in the field of performance compensation commitment and M&A.

关 键 词：业绩补偿承诺 信息不对称 并购绩效 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]