我国国有企业财政补贴的作用机理、现实迷失与硬预算约束  

The Functional Mechanism, Lost and Hard Budget Constraints of Financial Subsidies for State-owned Enterprises in China

作　　者：陆佳[1] Lu Jia

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学法学院

出　　处：《地方立法研究》2019年第5期23-38,共16页Local Legislation Journal

摘　　要：我国国有企业财政补贴产生于国有企业市场化改革初期。彼时,国家出于“疏解改革压力,提高社会整体福利水平”的目的,对国有企业实施了全面的预算软约束的财政补贴。但这种财政补贴终究只是权宜之计。当改革发展至一定阶段,国有企业财政补贴的效用会发生改变。此时,如果坚持原有的预算软约束财政补贴,将造成市场竞争秩序的破坏、贸易摩擦和社会资源的浪费,甚至影响社会经济的发展。因此,更为明智的选择自然是硬化财政补贴的预算约束。本文建议引入竞争中性原则和借鉴欧盟国家援助政策,建立预算法和竞争法相互交融的双重法律体系,探索一种硬预算约束国有企业财政补贴的法律进路。The financial subsidy of state-owned enterprises in China originated in the early stage of the market-oriented reform of state-owned enterprises.At that time,for the purpose of“relieving the pressure of reform and improving the overall welfare level of society”,the state implemented a comprehensive soft budget constraint financial subsidy for state-owned enterprises.But this kind of financial subsidy is only a temporary measure.When the reform develops to a certain stage,the effect of financial subsidies for state-owned enterprises should change.At this time,if we still adhere to the original soft budget constraint financial subsidies,it will cause the destruction of market competition order,trade conflicts and waste of social resources,and even affect the development of the social economy.Therefore,a more sensible choice would naturally be hardening the budgetary constraints on fiscal subsidies.Introducing the principle of competition neutrality,obtaining implications from EU state aid policy,and establishing a dual legal system that combines budgetary law and competition law are possible legal ways to harden budget restrictions on financial subsidies forstate-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：国有企业财政补贴 竞争中性原则 竞争法 硬预算约束 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]