官员访问与企业投融资期限错配  

Official Visits and Investment and Financing Term Mismatch of Enterprises

作　　者：邱穆青 白云霞[2] Qiu Muqing;Bai Yunxia(Business School,East China University of Science and Technology,Shanghai 200237,China;School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200082,China)

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237 [2]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200082

出　　处：《财经研究》2019年第10期138-152,共15页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71472138,71172079);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(19YJC630133);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2018M640353);中央高校基本科研业务费探索基金项目(WN1824001)

摘　　要：文章基于2006-2012年官员访问上市公司的事件,利用PSM和DID方法,考察了官员访问对企业投融资期限错配的影响。研究发现,官员访问显著增加了被访企业,尤其是国有企业的投资水平和期限错配程度。这种效应与地区GDP增长压力正相关,而与管理层过度自信的倾向无关。这说明这种效应受到官员政绩激励的影响,而不是官员访问引起管理层过度自信所导致的。官员访问引起的投资往往是低效率的,并进一步加剧了未来的期限错配程度。文章研究表明,出于政绩和晋升诉求,官员可能会促使企业采用期限错配的激进策略进行无效率投资,以在短期内改善GDP表现。文章为认识中国制度背景下官员访问的动机和后果提供了一个新视角,也有助于从制度层面廓清中国企业普遍存在的投融资期限错配现象。Compared with Western developed countries,China’s government officials often visit on site.Especially,when involving Central Government officials,the news is commonly placed conspicuously on the enterprise’s home page and even made into rolling news to attract public attention.Since 2008,the pressure on China’s economic growth has been increasing,and a concomitant phenomenon is that officials visit enterprises more frequently.We have observed that many industries with excess capacity and failed enterprises have been the focus of government officials’visits.This leads us to wonder whether the excess capacity and subsequent high leverage caused by debt-backed investments are related to official visits.If so,in the current economic downturn,will more frequent visits by government officials to enterprises spawn a new batch of overcapacity industries and highly indebted enterprises?More importantly,with excess capacity,there are not only high liabilities,but also the term mismatch of short-term liabilities to support long-term investment.The risk caused by term mismatch has increasingly become the source of all kinds of systemic financial risks in China.In addition,we need to answer what the nature of official visits is and whether the possible reasons for the impact of official visits on enterprises are the incentives for officials’achievements or the overconfidence of management.However,there is very little literature on the issue of term mismatch in China,and the systematic research on the phenomenon of official visits to enterprises is also very limited.Based on the data of official visits to listed companies collected manually from 2006 to 2012,this paper investigates the phenomenon of official visits and their impact on the term mismatch of enterprises by using PSM and DID methods.The results show that official visits significantly increase the level of investment and the degree of term mismatch of the enterprises interviewed,especially state-owned enterprises;then it is found that this effect is posit

关 键 词：政府干预 官员访问 期限错配 官员治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F423[经济管理—国民经济]