论道德思想试验中的直觉错位与后果主义的证成  

On the Misplaced Intuitions in Moral Thought Experiments and the Justification of Consequentialism

作　　者：葛四友[1] Ge Siyou

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系

出　　处：《社会科学》2019年第11期116-127,共12页Journal of Social Sciences

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学规划一般课题“帕菲特的功利主义思想研究”(项目编号:2019BZX003);中央高校基本科研业务费项目华东师范大学人文社会科学青年跨学科创新团队项目(项目编号:2018ECNU-QKT011)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：道德直觉对于各种道德理论的证成有着重要作用,不少学者拒绝后果主义的一个重大原因就在于它在各种道德思想试验中受到道德直觉的强有力反驳。然而,利用现实世界中的直觉反应挑战后果主义是错位的:后果主义的一般性要求针对的是理想世界,而现实的道德直觉反应立足的是现实世界。按照理想世界的条件来推测人们在理想世界的道德直觉反应时,后果主义的要求与之并不会有明显的冲突;而当我们比较当下的道德直觉和后果主义在现实世界的道德要求时,两者实际上是可以相匹配的。换言之,只要纠正道德思想试验中的直觉错位,那么后果主义实际上能够经受住各种道德直觉的反驳。It is commonly assumed that moral intuitions play key roles for justifying moral theories. Consequentialism is often rejected because it is subjected to powerful objections for its counter-intuitive conclusions in various cases. However, it is misleading to reject consequentialism because of the mismatch between the requirements of consequentialism in ideal world with our moral intuitions. Actually, It would be very likely that there is no mismatch if we compare the general requirements of consequentialism with the imagined moral intuitions that we would have in ideal world. Similar remarks could be made if we compare our moral intuitions with requirements that consequentialism would really suggest in actual world. That is to say, consequentialism can stand up to the test from moral intuitions.

关 键 词：思想试验 理想世界 后果主义 直觉错位 

分 类 号：B82-06[哲学宗教—伦理学]