流域环境污染第三方治理：合约关系与制度逻辑  

The Contract Relations and Institutional Logics of the Third-party Governance In Watershed Environmental Pollution

作　　者：吕志奎[1] 林荣全 LV Zhikui;LIN Rongquan(School of Public Affairs,Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian 361005)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学公共事务学院

出　　处：《中国人民大学学报》2019年第6期150-157,共8页Journal of Renmin University of China

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“中国流域公共治理机制研究”(19FZZA001);福建省2011计划“厦门大学公共政策与地方治理协同创新中心”项目

摘　　要：环境污染第三方治理的本质是合约治理。对于该治理机制的探讨需要回归合约或合同本身。而任何能被还原为合同关系的治理结构,在“合同人”的行为假定前提下,可用交易成本理论来解释。以Y区流域水环境第三方治理为例,运用扎根理论研究发现:科层制与合约制互嵌的制度场景建构了第三方治理过程。竞争性制度逻辑导致政府、排污方和治污方策略性互动,合约关系容易走向分离,面临第三方治理失灵的风险。实现第三方治理的有效性,还需更加规范的激励制度设计。The prevention and control of environmental pollution is one of the three major battles to win the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects in the new era.The thirdparty governance of environmental pollution advocates the establishment of contract relationship between the government and enterprises for pollution remediation,but the problem of governance failure in practical operation has aroused people's doubts about the use of contract system.Taking the third-party governance of water environment in Y district as an example,this paper uses the grounded theory to find that the institutional situation,in which bureaucracy and contractual system are embedded each other,dominates the process of governance,and the transaction costs are difficult to be effectively controlled.In the field of strategic interaction among government,pollutant dischargers and pollution control parties that is caused by the competitive institutional logic,contractual relationship tends to fall apart,having the risk of malfunction of third-party governance.More standardized incentive system design is required to improve the effectiveness of thirdparty governance.

关 键 词：环境治理 合约制 第三方治理 交易成本 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]