民营上市公司代理效率的影响因素评价  

Evaluative Analysis of Factors Affecting Agency Efficiency of Chinese Private Listed Firms

作　　者：李建博[1] 葛学峰 陈欣 LI Jianbo;GE Xuefeng;CHEN Xin(School of Management,Dalian Polytechnic University,Dalian 116034,China;College of Humanities and Law,Northeast Agricultural University,Harbin 150030,China)

机构地区：[1]大连工业大学管理学院,辽宁大连116034 [2]东北农业大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150030

出　　处：《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2019年第5期44-51,共8页Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目:“绿色增长理论与实践的国际比较研究”(71320107006);大连市社科联项目:“大连市协同创新平台的治理问题及对策研究”(2016dlskyb118)

摘　　要：以沪、深两市356家民营企业的代理效率为研究对象,使用随机前沿模型(Stochastic Frontier Model)测算它们在2011~2016年代理效率,通过回归系数与显著性分析其影响因素。研究结果表明:国内民营上市公司的代理效率总体上呈现较快的增长趋势,但是效率的损失仍然比较大;经理人(CEO)的股权激励与代理效率关系部分显著;董事会持股比例与代理效率存在正相关关系;董事会规模与代理效率呈现出倒U型曲线关系;经理人(CEO)薪酬与代理效率关系显著;董事长与经理人(CEO)是否亲缘关系和代理效率的关系并不显著。Based on the data drawn from 356 Chinese private listed firms between 2011 and 2015,the paper evaluates the agency efficiency with Stochastic Frontier Model and analyzes the main constraints by means of regressions coefficient and statistical significance.The results show that the overall efficiency increases faster,but the loss is still huge;The executive equity incentive is partially relevant to agency efficiency;An inverted-U relationship exists between board size and agency efficiency;The executive payment is apparently relevant to agency efficiency;Whether chairman and executive are relatives does not affect agency efficiency directly.

关 键 词：民营上市公司 经理人(CEO) 代理效率 企业价值 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]