出租车驾驶员交通违法行为演化博弈模型  

Evolutionary Game Model of Traffic Violations among Taxi Drivers

作　　者：江欣国[1,2] 周悦 夏亮[1,2] 付川云[1,2] JIANG Xinguo;ZHOU Yue;XIA Liang;FU Chuanyun(School of Transportation and Logistics,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 611756,China;National United Engineering Laboratory of Integrated and Intelligent Transportation,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,四川成都611756 [2]西南交通大学综合交通运输智能化国家地方联合工程实验室,四川成都610031

出　　处：《西南交通大学学报》2019年第6期1121-1128,F0002,共9页Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771191);中国博士后基金资助项目(2017T100710,2016M600748);四川省科技计划项目(2017ZR0209);中央高校基本科研业务费理工类科技创新项目(2682016CX052)

摘　　要：为研究违法成本对出租车驾驶员实施违法行为的影响,根据驾照管理方式,对交通违法成本构成及其累积过程进行研究.通过设置警戒分数线,将出租车驾驶员分为一般和临界两个状态,构建了不同执法策略条件下,出租车驾驶员与交通执法者间的演化博弈模型,并采用仿真手段模拟不同执法及驾照管理条件下,出租车驾驶员的违法策略变化情况.研究结果显示:执法水平和驾照分扣除程度直接影响违法成本,并决定双方的演化均衡;交通管理者对临界驾驶员采取低于一般驾驶员约30%的执法概率即可达到类似执法效果,临界驾驶员执法成本更低;相同执法水平下,临界驾驶员违法概率低于一般驾驶员;记分周期(1 a)内,每天相同人数更换驾照时,遭交通处罚的一般驾驶员人数相比不更换驾照条件多约10%,且随时间推移人数持续增加.相关改善措施可考虑调整执法策略或改变驾照更新制度,促使出租车驾驶员驾照资格从一般转入临界状态,有助于遏制其交通违法行为,降低交通执法成本.In order to investigate the mechanism of violation costs on taxi drivers’ traffic violation behavior,the composition and cumulation of traffic violation costs over time are explored with a demerit point system. To be specific,the taxi driver’s license status were classified into two categories by setting warning score,i.e.,ordinary driver and critical driver. An evolutionary game model was introduced to analyze the strategies adopted by taxi drivers and traffic policemen. Simulations were conducted to reveal the evolutionary outcomes of violation strategies under different enforcement and license management conditions. The results show that the violation costs,which impact the strategy equilibrium,is predominately determined by the level of law enforcement and deducted penalty points;for the numerical example,the administrative costsfor critical drivers are lower than those of the ordinary ones,revealing that police could use about 30% lower enforcement possibility to obtain the similar effectiveness;the violation probability of critical drivers is far lower as opposed to that of the ordinary drivers under the same enforcement;If there is equal number of drivers who daily reset their licenses,they would have 10% penalties than that of the driver whose licenses never reset in one cycle(1 a). Moreover,the penalty difference become much remarkable with time. The results demonstrate that turning the taxi driver ’s license qualification from ordinary into critical state through adjustable enforcement strategy will help to constrain the traffic violations and reduce the enforcement costs.

关 键 词：出租车 博弈论 成本 出租车驾驶员 交通违法 演化博弈模型 驾照管理制度 

分 类 号：U491.4[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]