论在刘易斯的理论下反事实假设能否与自然律共立  

Whether Counterfactual Suppositions Could be Cotenable with Laws of Nature under Lewis’s Theories

作　　者：陈千千 CHEN Qian-qian(Department of Philosophy,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2019年第6期37-43,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：重庆市文科基地重点项目“概念结构理论研究”(205001227)

摘　　要：直观上,如果反事实假设与现实世界的自然律逻辑一致,那么在该假设成立的情形下,现实世界的自然律仍然成立,即自然律能与满足一定条件的反事实假设共立。关于反事实条件句的理论需要解释这种直观。元语言理论可以很自然地解释该直观,但大卫·刘易斯认为该理论赋予了自然律过高的地位,可能世界语义理论可以在不赋予自然律过高地位的情况下解释该直观。如果刘易斯关于自然律的理论是最佳演绎系统理论,那么刘易斯的可能世界语义理论将不能解释这样的直观。这两个理论的结合会推出两个实际上不成立的预设,而这两个预设隐含于刘易斯的论证中。休谟式依附性立场是刘易斯无法解释该直观的根源所在。Intuitively,if a counterfactual supposition is logically consistent with actual world’s laws of nature,then whenever the supposition holds,actual world’s laws of nature would still hold.In other words,laws of nature could be cotenable with counterfactual supposition satisfying some certain conditions.Any theory of counterfactual should explain this kind of intuition.Metalinguistic theory of counterfactual can explain it naturally,D.Lewis doubted the special status of laws of nature given by metalinguistic theory.He thought within the theory of possible worlds semantics he could explain the intuition without giving laws of nature special status.If Lewis’s theory about laws of nature is the theory of best deductive system,then Lewis’s theory of possible worlds semantics will not be able to explain such intuition.The combination of these two theories could entail two presumptions which are not right actually but implied by Lewis’s argument on explaining that intuition.It’s Lewis’s stance of Humean supervenience that makes him unable to explain.

关 键 词：刘易斯 反事实条件句 可能世界语义理论 自然律 最佳演绎系统理论 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]