国有企业混合所有制改革下股东利益博弈分析  

Analysis of shareholder interest game in mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises

作　　者：王亚男 葛玉辉[1] WANG Ya-nan;GE Yu-hui(School of Management,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院

出　　处：《沈阳工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2019年第6期532-536,共5页Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家软科学研究计划项目(2013GXQ4D165);教育部课题(17YJA630020);上海市教委科研创新重点项目(14ZS117);上海市一流学科建设项目(S1201YLXK);沪江基金项目(A14006)

摘　　要：国有企业混合所有制改革是当前理论探讨的热点。以分权控制理论为基础,构建国有股东、民营股东和监督机构三方的利益博弈模型,并对模型进行分析。结果显示,国有股东侵占民营股东的概率受监督机构监督成本和国有股东被监督损失等因素的影响,监督机构选择自主监督国有股东的概率受国有股东侵占行为惩罚力度系数、国有股东侵占额外收益和民营股东诉讼赔偿等因素影响。要加强对国有股东的惩罚力度,发挥好政府的监督作用,增强中小股东权利保障机制,推进国有企业混合所有制改革的步伐。The reform of mixed ownership in state-owned enterprises is a hot topic in current theoretical exploration.Based on the theory of decentralized control,an interest game model is constructed among state-owned shareholders,private shareholders and supervisory organizations,and the model is studied.According to the research results,the probability of state-owned shareholders encroaching on private shareholders is influenced by cost of supervision by supervisory agencies and state shareholders are being monitored for losses,etc.The probability of independent supervision of state-owned shareholders is influenced by coefficient of punishment intensity when state-owned shareholders commit embezzlement,additional benefits from the expropriation of state shareholders and litigation compensation to be paid by private shareholders.The penalties for state shareholders need to be toughened,and the oversight role of the government should be given full role.The protection mechanism should be strengthened for the rights of minority shareholders so as to promote the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：国有企业 混合所有制改革 股东利益 不完全信息静态博弈 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]