嵌入双向期权的激励相容型CoPS研发合约设计  

Design of incentive compatible R&D contract embedded with bi-direction options in CoPS

作　　者：陈占夺 CHEN Zhan-duo(Institute of China's State-owned Enterprises,China Business Executives Academy,Dalian 116086,China)

机构地区：[1]中国大连高级经理学院中国国有企业研究院

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2019年第9期81-95,共15页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：辽宁省社会科学规划基金资助项目(L16BJY008);辽宁省2018经济发展课题资助项目(2018lslktyb-113)

摘　　要：有别于聚焦在过程管理或降低信息不对称的现有研究,论文建立了可实现激励相容的复杂产品系统研发外包合约模型.通过对三种模型(标准、考虑质量保函、嵌入双向期权)比较,得出:1)过程控制无法解决“整体次优”,也无法根治“偷懒”;2)质量保函可以在一定程度上解决“偷懒”问题;3)嵌入分享和处罚双向期权的激励相容型研发外包合约,因为以努力行为的结果来决定分包商收益,消除了信息不对称的影响,所以可同时解决“偷懒”和“整体次优”,达到整体最优.研究从新视角审视了信息不对称,解决了“偷懒”和“整体次优”,是对激励相容理论和合约治理在外包领域的扩展和深入,为管理实践的外包合约治理提供了全新思路.Differing from the current studies which focus on the process management or the reduction of the information asymmetry,this paper establishes an incentive compatible outsourcing contract model for R&D in CoPS.The following results are derived by comparing three models-the standard game model(model Ⅰ),the modified game model embedded with quality guarantee(model Ⅱ),and the improved model embedded with the bi-direction option of sharing and penalty(model Ⅲ):1)Process control(model Ⅰ),cannot solve the problem of "sub-optimal in whole",nor can it eliminate the sub-contractor's"lazy"behavior;2)To a certain extent,sub-contractors'"lazy"behavior can be alleviated by quality guarantee(model Ⅱ);3)The improved contract(model Ⅲ)can solve the above two problems and achieve overall optimum,since information asymmetry will be eliminated when the sub-contractor'income is decided by his own effort.This paper examines information asymmetry from a new perspective and solves the problems of "sub-optimal in whole"and"laziness".It is an expansion and deepening of incentive compatibility theory and contract governance in outsourcing field,and it provides a new idea for outsourcing contract governance in management practices.

关 键 词：研发外包 激励相容 嵌入式合约 复杂产品系统 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理] F272.3[经济管理—国民经济]