资源依赖、关系合同与组织能力——政府购买公共服务中的社会组织发展研究  

Resource Dependence, Relational Contract and Organizational Capability:Study on the Development of Social Organizations in Government Purchasing Public Services

作　　者：叶托[1] YE Tuo(School of Public Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou,Guangdong,510640)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《行政论坛》2019年第6期61-69,共9页Administrative Tribune

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“政府购买公共服务中的知识共享及其治理研究”(17YJC630201);广东省哲学社会科学规划项目“政府购买公共服务的问责体系研究：基于模式—机制—工具的维度”(GD16CZZ01);华南理工大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目“政府购买公共服务情境下社会组织的自主空间与能力发展研究”(XYZD201926)

摘　　要：对于社会组织而言,组织能力的重要性并不亚于组织自主。随着政府购买公共服务的兴起,社会组织对政府的资源依赖程度正日渐加深。这种资源依赖对社会组织的组织能力产生非线性影响,关系合同在二者之间起到中间变量的作用,能够化解因资源依赖而设立的正式监控带来的一些负面影响。通过多案例的比较分析,发现两个结论:一是在资源依赖的背景下社会组织能力发展可能会出现两种异化现象,要么过度强调非正式关系,要么过度强调合同指标;二是关系合同的建立有助于减少正式监控的弊端,但并不一定能促进组织能力的提升。For social organizations, the organizational capability is as important as organizational autonomy. With the rise of government purchasing public services, social organizations have further deepened their reliance on government resources. This resource dependence has a non-linear impact on the organizational capacity of social organizations, and the relationship contract plays an important intermediate role in reducing the negative effects of formal monitoring systems established by the resource dependency. Through comparative analysis of multiple cases, two viewpoints are found: in the context of resource dependence, there may be two misguided phenomena in the development of social organizational capacity, either overemphasizing informal relationships or overemphasizing contract indicators;the establishment of relationship contract helps to reduce the disadvantages of formal monitoring, but it does not necessarily improve the organizational capacity.

关 键 词：社会组织 政府购买公共服务 资源依赖 关系合同 组织能力 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学] C912[政治法律—中外政治制度]