大股东监督与员工持股计划的替代效应研究——基于2014年员工持股制度改革的经验数据  

Research on the Substitution Effect of Large Shareholder Monitoring and Employee Stock Ownership Plan: Based on Experience Data of the Reform of Employee Shareholding System in 2014

作　　者：王烨[1,3] 盛明泉[2] 孙慧倩[3] WANG Ye;SHENG MingQuan;SUN HuiQian(School of Accounting,Wuxi Taihu University,Wuxi 214064;School of Accounting,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu 233030;School of Accounting,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815)

机构地区：[1]无锡太湖学院会计学院,江苏无锡214064 [2]安徽财经大学会计学院,安徽蚌埠233030 [3]南京审计大学会计学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《财贸研究》2019年第11期94-110,共17页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“激励机制错位与企业全要素生产率研究”(18AJY014)

摘　　要：利用2014年7月1日至2016年12月31日期间已公布员工持股计划公司的数据,对大股东监督与员工持股计划之间的替代效应及其影响因素进行研究,结果发现:第一大股东持股比例与是否选择员工持股计划及员工持股激励强度呈显著的负相关关系,即第一大股东持股比例越高,公司越不倾向于实行员工持股计划,且实施的员工持股激励强度越低,也就是说,大股东监督与员工持股计划之间存在替代效应。进一步研究显示,人力资本禀赋高会强化大股东监督与员工持股计划之间的替代效应;同时,大股东监督与员工持股计划之间的替代效应还会因公司所处地区市场化程度较低而得到强化。This paper study the substitution effect between the supervision over big shareholders and employee shareholding incentive and its influencing factors using logistic binary choice model based on the data of the employee stock ownership plan which have announced by company from July 1,2014 to December 31,2016.It is found that there is a significant negative correlation between the first big shareholder shareholding and the choice of employee stock ownership plan,and there is a significant negative correlation between the first big shareholder shareholding and employee shareholding incentive strength.The higher the proportion of the first largest shareholder is,the less the possibility to implement employee stock ownership plan is,and the lower employee shareholding incentive strength is.That is to say,there is the substitution effect between the supervision of big shareholder and employee shareholding incentive.The study also found that high human capital endowment will strengthen the substitution effect between the supervision of big shareholder and employee shareholding incentive,at the same time,the substitution effect between the supervision of big shareholder and employee shareholding incentive will be strengthened by low marketization degree.

关 键 词：员工持股计划 股权集中度 人力资本禀赋 市场化程度 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]