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作 者:崔晶 CUI Jing(Business School,Jilin University,Changchun 130012,China)
机构地区:[1]吉林大学商学院
出 处:《商业研究》2019年第12期57-65,共9页Commercial Research
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目,项目编号:71871104
摘 要:虽然企业通过并购能提高市场竞争力,但供应链中企业不同的主导权结构可能导致并购不能充分发挥其市场优势。本文基于两个差异化竞争制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,在市场竞争和市场并购情形下,分别构建由各个制造商主导和零售商主导的供应链博弈模型,考察差异化竞争制造商的市场并购策略以及不同主导权结构对并购价值的影响。研究发现:在不同情形下,处于供应链主导地位的成员企业总是能够通过实施高价策略获取更多利润;差异化竞争制造商的市场并购策略能够有效提升供应端企业的利润水平,但却也会导致零售商和供应链系统会受到双重边际效应的负影响,并使得产品总需求降低;制造商拥有主导权时具有更大的动机实施并购策略,而零售商处于主导地位则能缓解供应链上游垄断对其造成的不利影响。Although enterprises can reduce competition through Mergers and Acquisitions(M&A),different dominant structure of enterprises in supply chain may lead to M&A can not give full play to its market advantage.Based on the supply chain composed of two differentiated competitive manufacturers and one retailer,in the market competition and market M&A situation,this paper constructs the supply chain game model dominated by each manufacturer and retailer respectively,and investigates the market M&A strategy of differentiated competitive manufacturers and the impact of different dominant structure on M&A value.The results show that:in different situations,the member enterprises in the leading position of the supply chain can always obtain more profits through the implementation of high price strategy;the market M&A strategy of differentiated competitive manufacturers can effectively improve the profit level of supply-side enterprises,but it will also lead to the negative impact of double marginal effects on retailers and supply chain system,and reduce the total demand of products;when the manufacturer has the dominant power,it has greater motivation to implement M&A strategy,while the retailer in the dominant position can alleviate the adverse impact of upstream monopoly on the supply chain.
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