考虑双延迟效应的供应链动态营销合作策略  

Supply Chain Dynamic Marketing Cooperation Strategy Considering Double Delay Effect

作　　者：郭大伟 戴更新[1] 马德青 胡劲松[1] GUO Da-wei;DAI Geng-xin;MA De-qing;HU Jin-song(Business School of Qingdao university,Qingdao 266071,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院

出　　处：《系统工程》2019年第6期46-57,共12页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771129)

摘　　要：从供应链产品营销的角度出发,考虑制造商和零售的营销努力均存在延迟效应时对产品商袴的影响,构建了基于双延迟效应的动态微分模型。运用极大值原理,得到了制造商和零售商在集中和分散决策下的最优营销努力策略、产品商誉和最优利润。研究发现:制造商和零售商的营销努力策略均是其延迟时间的减函数。在延迟效应影响下,双方的营销努力策略均低于发生即时效应时的相应情形;受延迟效应影响•体系的总利润在集中式决策时并不总是优于分散式决策,只有在两个延迟时间满足一定的条件时,选择集中式决策才为最优;分散决策下,利润分配比例达到一定条件时,制造商才愿意为零售商提供补贴。且零售商营销努力延迟时间增加时.制造商将提高该补贴比例。补贴比例越大,零售商营销努力水平越高。From the perspective of supply chain product marketing, consider the impact of manufacturer and retail marketingefforts on product goodwill when there is a delay effect and a dynamic differential model based on double delay effect isconstructed. Using the principle of maximum value, we obtain the optimal marketing efforts strategy* product reputationand optimal profit of manufacturers and retailers under centralized and decentralized decision-making. The study foundthat the marketing efforts strategies of both manufacturers and retailers are both a decreasing function of their delay time,and are lower than the immediate effect of the marketing efforts of both parties;the total profit of the system is notalways better than the decentralized decision under centralized decision. Only when the two delay time meets certainconditions≫ the centralized decision is optimal. Under decentralized decision-making, manufacturers are willing to providesubsidies to retailers when the proportion of profit distribution reaches certain conditions. And when the retailer' smarketing efforts delayed time increas the manufacturer will increase the subsidy ratio. The greater the subsidy ratio≫the higher the level of retailer marketing efforts.

关 键 词：延迟效应 营销合作 产品商誉 动态微分模型 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]