会计师事务所声誉与并购业绩补偿承诺  

Auditor Reputation and M&A Compensation Commitment

作　　者：刘向强[1] 李沁洋[1] Liu Xiangqiang;Li Qinyang

机构地区：[1]西南大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《审计研究》2019年第6期79-86,共8页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71902165);教育部人文社科基金项目(项目批准号:17YJC630063、18YJC630101);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(项目批准号:SWU1909423)的资助

摘　　要：以2008〜2017年在并购重组交易方案中披露业绩补偿承诺的上市公司为样本,研究会计师事务所声誉与并购业绩补偿承诺之间的关系。研究发现,高声誉会计师事务所参与的并购重组交易,其业绩补偿承诺随后实现的程度更高。这是因为在高声誉会计师事务所参与的并购重组交易中,目标公司给出的承诺利润更低,因而其在承诺期内实现的净利润更可能高于承诺利润数。进一步研究发现,在目标公司采用股权补偿方式以及制度环境更好的地区,会计师事务所声誉与并购业绩补偿承诺之间的关系更为显著。研究结论丰富了并购业绩补偿承诺影响因素的研究,拓展了会计师事务所声誉信号机制的研究视角。同时,可以为监管部门及市场投资者提供并购业绩补偿承诺的增量信息。This study examines the relationship between the reputation of auditors and compensation commitment based on China’s listed companies that disclosed compensation commitment in mergers and acquisitions(M&A)during 2008-2017.We find that high-reputation auditors in M&A lead to higher realization ratio of commitment.Further analysis find that the positive effect of reputation on compensation commitment is more significant when target firm compensates with stocks and the institutional environment is better.In addition,we find high-reputation auditors reduce promised profits.This is because when high-reputation auditors are involved in M&A cases,targeted companies tend to offer lower promised profits,and therefore the net profit in commitment period could be higher than promised profits.This study enriches the literature on determinants of compensation commitments and expand the signaling mechanism research of auditor reputation.Our finding may provide market regulators and investors with incremental information about M&A compensation commitments.

关 键 词：会计师事务所声誉 并购重组 业绩补偿承诺 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]