基于演化博弈的企业创新网络协同行为及提升策略研究  被引量:2

Research on Synergy Behavior and Promotion Strategy of Enterprise Innovation Network Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

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作  者:魏云凤 史文雷 阮平南[2] WEI Yun-feng;SHI Wen-lei;RUAN Ping-nan(School of Urban Transportation,Beijing University of Technology,Beijing 100124,China;School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Technology,Beijing 100124,China)

机构地区:[1]北京工业大学城市交通学院,北京100124 [2]北京工业大学经济管理学院,北京100124

出  处:《数学的实践与认识》2019年第23期18-30,共13页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基  金:国家自然科学基金项目“战略性新兴产业集群协同创新发生机理研究:基于动态演化视角”(71562022);北京市博士后工作经费资助项目(ZZ2019-141)

摘  要:企业只有通过创新掌握行业内领先技术才能谋求持续的发展,构建企业创新网络进行协同创新是企业克服资源稀缺、技术复杂实现创新目标的有效途径,主体间协同是企业创新网络实现可持续性与稳定性的基本前提.基于演化博弈理论,探究企业创新网络协同主体之间的协同演化行为,并从主体之间交易成本的降低、加强信任关系、提高协同意识、构建合理分配等方面给出提升策略.研究成果对于提升企业创新网络整体协同水平,保障其协同创新活动顺利开展提供一定的借鉴作用.Only by grasping the leading technology in the industry can enterprises seek sustainable development.Constructing enterprise innovation network for collaborative innovation is an effective way for enterprises to overcome the shortage of resources and complex technology to achieve innovation goals.And the synergy among entities is the basic premise for achieving sustainability and stability in enterprise innovation networks.Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper explores the cooperative evolution behavior among the cooperative agents of enterprise innovation network,and puts forward the promotion strategies from the aspects of reducing transaction costs between the agents,strengthening trust relations,improving the sense of coordination,and building a reasonable distribution.The research results can be used as a reference for improving the overall synergy level of enterprise innovation network and ensuring the smooth developnent of its synergistic innovation activities.

关 键 词:企业创新网络 协同 协同行为 协同优化 演化博弈 

分 类 号:F27[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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