年报问询监管、审计风险与审计定价——基于锚定效应理论的视角  

Regulation through Questioning on Annual Financial Report, Audit Risks and Audit Pricing

作　　者：殷红 

机构地区：[1]苏州市职业大学商学院

出　　处：《中国注册会计师》2019年第12期22-29,3,共9页The Chinese Certified Public Accountant

基　　金：江苏省高校哲学社会科学项目“政治资本猝变、寻租与企业非财务信息披露的作用机理研究”（2018SJA1395）;苏州市职业大学人才启动金项目“互联网+人工智能环境下会计师事务所智力资本信息披露研究”（3180138）;苏州市职业大学社会审计功能拓展研究科研创新团队（201804000065）

摘　　要：一、引言证券交易所在上市公司信息披露方面承担着一线监管责任。交易所的监管方式多样,包括行政处罚性监管和非行政处罚性监管(陈运森等,2018a)。其中,非行政处罚性监管以出具问询函为代表。当交易所在审核上市公司发布的公告过程中发现其信息披露或交易行为未达到监管标准时主动发函问询,要求上市公司补充披露或做出解释,而非直接给予行政处罚,因此,被称作"非行政处罚性监管"。With the A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2018 as the research samples,from the perspective of anchoring effect theory,this article examines the impacts on auditors’behaviors by enhancing the regulation approach of questioning on annual financial reports.It shows that the companies which receive such questioning letters for their annual financial reports in the previous period will pay more audit fees in the current period,especially when those companies change their auditors in the current period.It further reveals that such a regulation approach can only have positive impacts on audit fees in the companies not audited by"big four"accounting firms and non-SOEs.By analyzing the mechanism,it finds that the reason for such a positive correlation is that compared to the companies which do not receive the questioning letters,the companies which receive questioning letters assume obviously more management agency costs or controlling shareholder agency costs,so auditors are exposed to higher audit risks.

关 键 词：行政处罚 证券交易所 锚定效应 上市公司信息披露 审计定价 监管标准 交易行为 审计风险 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F239.4