影响公司高管交易行为内部差异的因素：“信息优势”还是“收入补偿动机”  

Which Factor Dominates the Difference in the Behavior of Insider Trading in a Company: Information Superiority or Incentive of Income Replacement

作　　者：曾庆生[1] 程博 Zeng Qingsheng;Cheng Bo(Research Institute of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai University of Finance&Economics;Jiyang College,Zhejiang Agriculture&Forestry University)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院 [2]浙江农林大学暨阳学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2019年第6期127-139,共13页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71372039、71632006);教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(18JJD790010)资助

摘　　要：本文以2007-2013年上市公司高管交易为研究对象,采用公司内高管相对薪酬水平作为"信息优势"和"收入补偿动机"的双重代理变量,考察了公司高管交易行为内部差异的可能影响因素。研究发现,高管在公司的薪酬相对水平越高,其交易的主动性越强,买卖股票的超常回报特别是短期回报越高。这一关系并不因信息环境变化而发生实质性改变,表明公司内不同高管买卖股票的主动性和交易回报的差异主要由其信息优势决定,而内部薪酬差异引起的收入补偿动机并未产生决定性影响。本文不仅丰富了内部人交易方面的文献,而且有助于证券监管部门明确高管交易的重点监控对象,预防潜在的内幕交易,从而维护市场交易的公平性。The literature has shown that insider trading has received excessive returns, and the extraordinary return of insider trading is likely to originate from the private information held by insiders. Therefore, many markets have set a lock-up period for prohibiting insider trading of listed companies, and also require insiders to disclose timely changes in its shareholdings, China’s capital market is no exception. In fact, the ability to acquire private information and the motive of trading profit are the two basic factors that affect the behavior of insiders and the return of transactions. However, the existing literature rarely distinguishes them completely, especially in the specific market environment, which is private information in nature. It is not known whether the ability to acquire or the monetization of the transaction dominates the insider’s trading behavior and its return. We believe that the relative level of executive compensation within the company is a proxy variable that can describe not only his ability to obtain private information but also his motivation to make profits from trading, which provides a good opportunity for the study of insider trading behavior in China’s capital market. Based on the logic of "information advantage effect", given that every insider has the same profit motive, that is, to make full use of the private information he or she has, this paper expects that the executives with stronger ability to acquire private information are more likely to actively buy and sell company shares and the abnormal return of trading is higher. Based on the logic of "income compensation", this paper expects that the lower the relative level of compensation, the stronger the incentive for the executives to get compensation through stock trading returns, so they are more likely to actively trade and the higher the abnormal return of trading. Taking the insider trading of listed companies from 2007 to 2013 as the research object, this paper uses insider’s relative pay level in the company

关 键 词：高管交易 薪酬相对水平 信息优势 收入补偿动机 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]