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作 者:唐慧玲[1] TANG Huiling(School of Accountancy,Shanghai University of Financeand Economics,Shanghai200433,China)
机构地区:[1]上海财经大学会计学院
出 处:《当代经济科学》2019年第6期108-119,共12页Modern Economic Science
摘 要:基于纳什均衡理论和演化博弈理论,研究了绿色供应链中政府和企业关于减排问题的行为博弈。首先根据政府服务大众的职能,创新地以社会福利函数表征了政府目标函数,求解得出政企博弈的纳什均衡策略为:监管、低碳化生产,并对纳什均衡的成立条件做出了合理的经济学解释。然后考虑到实际情况中博弈参与者的不完全理性,修改了政府目标函数。利用双种群演化博弈论描述了政企博弈的过程,剖析出四种不同条件下的演化稳定策略并赋予了经济学含义。最后比较了两种博弈分析的不同点,结合计算得出的博弈均衡策略,分别从政府、企业和消费者的角度提出了政策建议。研究表明:只有政府、企业、民众三方协同努力,政府严格监管且企业自主减排的目标才可能实现。Using the Nash equilibrium theory and Evolutionary game theory, this paper studies the behavior game of government and enterprise on emission reduction in the green supply chain. Firstly, according to the government’s function of serving the public, the government’s objective function is innovatively represented by social welfare function and the Nash equilibrium strategy of the government-enterprise game is solved as(supervision, low-carbon production). Establishment conditions of Nash equilibrium are given for reasonable economic explanations. After considering the incomplete rationality of game participants in the actual situation, the government objective function is modified. The process of the government-enterprise game is described by using a two-population evolutionary game, then the evolutionary stabilization strategies under four different conditions are analyzed, and are endowed by economic implications. Finally, the differences between the two-game analysis are compared;the policy suggestions are put forward from the perspective of government, enterprises and consumers based on the game equilibrium strategies calculated. This study reveals that only when the government, enterprises and the public work together can the goal of strict government supervision and enterprises’ independent emission reduction be achieved.
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