股权结构、高管薪酬粘性与预算松弛  

Shareholding structure,executive pay stickiness and budgetary slack

作　　者：安灵[1] 赵婷 易丹青 AN Ling;ZHAO Ting;YI Danqing(School of Accountancy,Chongqing University of Technology,Chongqing 400054,China;Qijiang People’s Hospital of Chongqing,Chongqing 401420,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学会计学院,重庆400054 [2]重庆市綦江区人民医院,重庆401420

出　　处：《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》2019年第12期95-103,共9页Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“松弛治理视角下国有资本经营预算微观衔接机制优化研究”(19XGL006);重庆市研究生科研创新项目“基于委托代理视角的高管薪酬与预算松弛研究”(CYS17285);重庆市社会科学规划项目“预算松弛治理视角下地方国有资本经营预算优化研究”(2017QNGL54)

摘　　要：预算是企业管理的重要工具,但由于预算松弛等因素的影响,预算管理功效在实践中颇受争议。选用2010—2017年沪深A股上市公司面板数据,在考虑股权结构背景下,运用实证研究探索高管薪酬粘性对预算松弛有何种影响。结果表明:高管薪酬粘性正向影响预算松弛程度,但这一相关关系因股权结构差异而有不同表现:非国有企业中高管薪酬粘性与预算松弛不相关,而国有企业中二者显著正相关;适当地提升股权集中度将会减弱高管薪酬粘性对预算松弛的抑制作用,说明股东监督力度的加强有助于降低高管构建预算松弛的动机,减少委托代理成本,制约经理人牟取私利。基于委托代理视角为高管薪酬粘性对预算松弛的影响机制提供一定的理论依据和经验证据,进而丰富预算松弛的生成动因研究,有利于延展新的视角服务于预算松弛的治理。Budgeting is an important tool for business management,the effectiveness of budget management is controversial in practice because of some factors such as budgetary slack.In the background of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017,this paper empirically analyzes the impact of executive pay stickiness on the budgetary slack in the context of theownership structure.The study found that there is a positive correlation between executive pay stickiness with budgetary slack,but this relationship has different performance due to the difference of ownership structure:the non-state-owned enterprise executive compensation stickiness is not related tobudgetary slack,while the relationship of the state-owned enterprises is exactly positive;the increase of ownership concentration will weaken the restraint effect of executive pay stickiness on budgetary slack.This shows that the enhancement of shareholder supervision can help reduce the motivation of senior managers to build budget slackness,reduce the commission agency costs,and control the private interests of managers.Based on the perspective of principal-agent,this paper provides some theoretical basis and empirical evidence for the influence mechanism of executive pay stickiness on budgetary slack based on the principal-agent perspective,which enriches the research on the motivation of budgetary slack generation,and is conducive to extending the new perspective to serve the governance.

关 键 词：高管薪酬粘性 预算松弛 股权结构 委托代理成本 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]