政府管制下内外资企业绿色创新扩散的演化博弈研究  

Evolutionary Game Research on the Diffusion of Green Innovation of Domestic and Foreign Enterprises under Government Control

作　　者：杨朝均[1] 刘冰 毕克新 YANG Chao-jun;LIU Bing;BI Ke-xin(School of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093;School of Economics and Management,Harbin Engineering University,Harbin 150001;School of Management,Harbin University of Science and Technology,Harbin 150080)

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,昆明650093 [2]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,哈尔滨150001 [3]哈尔滨理工大学管理学院,哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《软科学》2019年第12期86-91,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71502074);云南省哲学社会科学规划项目(YB2016014)

摘　　要：为综合分析绿色创新扩散过程,将绿色创新的扩散方、采纳方以及监管方统一于绿色创新扩散系统下,基于演化博弈理论构建绿色创新扩散博弈模型并进行稳定性分析,结合数值仿真动态模拟政府管制策略的变化对绿色创新扩散的影响。仿真结果表明:政府的监管成本对绿色创新扩散的影响呈现负相关,监管比例对绿色创新扩散的影响呈现正相关;政府的补贴和罚金措施对绿色创新扩散的影响不一;政府对外资企业的调控和知识产权使用费的调整对绿色创新扩散的影响较为复杂。Gathering the diffusers, adopters, and regulators of green innovation under the green innovation diffusion system, this paper constructs the game model of green innovation diffusion and analyzes its stability based on evolutionary game theory. And then, it combines numerical simulation to explore the government’s impact on the spread of green innovation. Results show that government’s regulatory cost has a negative impact on the spread of green innovation. The government’s reward and punishment mechanism is more obvious for the evolution of green innovation diffusion. In addition, regarding the government’s control over foreign investment and the adjustment of intellectual property transfer fees, the evolutionary trend of green innovation diffusion is more complicated.

关 键 词：政府管制 绿色创新扩散 三方博弈 仿真 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]